Falling credit standards? by Garratt, D & Pannell, B
Introduction
It would be all too easy to presume that the pressures
facing mortgage lenders are leading them to act
imprudently reducing the quality of their credit
appraisal. This article looks at this charge head-on.
There is little doubt about the competitiveness of the
mortgage industry. McLaughlin and Fenton (2000), in
a detailed analysis of the competitive pressures facing
lenders, highlighted the overcapacity of the market
and the effect that this has had on lenders’ margins.
Pressure on credit standards has inevitably increased
as lenders have fought for new business. The market
has seen the development of a range of innovative
products increasingly tailored to the demands of
customers. Customers themselves have become
increasingly confident about their own financial
circumstances. Survey evidence suggests that
households have never been so confident about their
future financial prospects.
The recent strong growth in house prices has reduced
affordability by increasing entry costs for purchasers
into the housing market. Given that the primary role
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High loan to value (LTV) lending peaked at more than one-quarter of all new loans in the late
1980s - early 1990s. Subsequently, the share progressively declined before levelling-off. 
Nationally there is little evidence of an increasing proportion of very high income multiple loans,
although London does have an especially high proportion. Away from southern parts of the UK, the
profile is much more benign.
There has been no obvious decline in credit standards alongside the substantial increase in
remortgaging activity of the past few years.
To the extent that mortgage lending criteria have changed in recent years, this is largely in response
to low inflation and, in particular, the smaller and more stable share of household budgets taken up
by mortgage payments.
The use of more sophisticated risk management tools has allowed mortgage lenders to write some
higher-risk business, but typically this is constrained within predetermined portfolio limits.
Consumer credit in 2000 was the equivalent of 13% of the UK’s GDP – double the figure in the late
1980s and considerably more rapid growth than for mortgage debt. Lack of good quality
information about how consumer credit is distributed across households makes it difficult to gauge
its overall significance. But such rapid growth almost certainly represents some increase in the total
credit risk facing mortgage lenders.
Flexible mortgages blur the boundaries between secured and unsecured debt. Their increasing
popularity poses new questions about what constitutes prudent mortgage lending practice. This is
likely to require close monitoring and further research over the coming years.
of mortgage lenders is to help satisfy people’s
aspiration for home-ownership and to realise
households’ potential to move along the property
ladder, such affordability constraints have further
added to the pressure on credit standards.
Alongside market pressures, regulatory developments
have the potential to influence lending practice.
Nowhere is this better illustrated than the intended
introduction from 2003 of a Homes Condition Report
(HCR) as part of the Seller’s Information Pack.
Lenders have resisted the pressure to accept the HCR
as an automatic replacement for their own property
valuation, largely because of concerns about ongoing
risk assessment.
With so much pressure on lenders to relax credit
standards, it is perhaps not surprising that some
commentators seized on concerns expressed by
Howard Davies, the Chairman of the Financial
Services Authority, about a perceived fall in quality
of lenders’ credit appraisals. Speaking at two CML
events in 2000, he pointed to an upward drift in
average income multiples and an increase in the
number of loans at high income multiples. While
acknowledging the many benefits of today’s radically
different economic backdrop from that in the late
1980s, he reminded lenders that there were inherent
dangers in a low inflation environment. In particular,
low inflation leads to a slower erosion of debt
burdens. Additionally, the fact that confident
households have increased their take-up of non-
mortgage debt also becomes important in assessing
the potential default risk of borrowers.
Howard Davies also asked lenders to pay ‘close
attention’ to the London housing market where
affordability constraints were typically most tight and
where a large gap had built up in house prices relative
to the rest of the country. If the London premium was
to fall significantly then high loan to value ratios pose
potential risks to lenders.
Historical Perspective
In judging current credit standards comparisons are
often drawn with the housing boom-bust period of the
late 1980s and early 1990s. At the height of the late
1980s economic boom the economy was growing at
an annual rate in excess of 5% while consumers’
spending was growing at 71⁄2%. Strong economic
growth was not initially accompanied by excess rates
of inflation so supporting the idea that supply-side
reform had radically altered the economy’s growth
potential. Economic commentators and analysts
‘bought into’ a new economic paradigm.
On the surface, at least, household balance sheets
looked healthy in the late 1980s. Net financial wealth
(assets minus debt) had increased from 11⁄4 times
personal disposable income at the start of the decade to
a then historic high of 21⁄2 times. Taking into account
physical wealth, household wealth was 61⁄2 times
income - compared to just under 4 in 1980.
Understandably, perhaps, the corresponding increase in
mortgage debt from one-third to three-quarters times
income did not appear unduly troublesome. However,
the apparent strength of the balance sheets owed much
to rising equity and property prices. As the UK
economy overheated in the late 1980s house prices
were rising nationally at an annual rate of up to 30%.
Such house price increases proved not to be
sustainable, however. During the economic downturn,
between 1989 and 1993 house prices in real terms
(inflation-adjusted) fell by close on 30%. Not only was
the UK’s economic miracle exposed as a myth, but the
position of household finances, which had seemed so
healthy, very quickly became woefully precarious.
Loan to Value Ratios
The FSA is naturally concerned with the risks posed
by significant volumes of high loan-to-value (LTV)
lending on lenders’ books. This potentially leaves
lenders exposed in the event of falling house prices or
with loans remaining higher risk business for longer. 
Looking at Chart 1, it is clear that lenders were left
exposed on new lending at the end of the 1980s and
early in the 1990s. In the late 1980s - early 1990s the
proportion of LTVs of 100% or more rose to one-
quarter of new loans. This proportion steadily
declined in the first half of the 1990s and has been
fairly constant since at between 4%-5%. The
proportion of loans in the next risky class of 95% to
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CHART 1: LOAN TO VALUE BANDS, ALL BUYERS, % OF TOTAL
Source: CML/DETR Survey of Mortgage Lenders
100% has in recent times declined too. Last year,
one-quarter of lending was with LTVs of 95% or
more which compares favourably with one-third
through much of the 1990s. 
The increase in the proportion of LTVs in excess of
100% in the late 1980s - early 1990s was largely
driven by lending to first-time buyers, not least
reflecting Right to Buy (technically, the Survey of
Mortgage Lenders monitors the ratio of loan size to
purchase price, rather than valuation). Amongst first-
time buyers 40% of loans had LTVs at 100% plus,
compared to 8% amongst those moving house. Last
year, the corresponding proportions were 8% and 2%
respectively! Regional differences appear pretty
minor. In Greater London, for instance, the split in
2000 was almost identical with 7% of LTVs of 100%
or more amongst first-time buyers and 11⁄2% amongst
former owner-occupiers. London also accounted for
10% of all house purchase loans with LTVs of 100%
or more - exactly in line with its share of mortgage
advances for house purchase.
In terms of trends at least, competitive pressures and
house price patterns have not led to an obvious
deterioration in the risk standard of lenders’ books.
This favourable outcome might be the result of a
‘rationing effect’ from steady income multiple
lending and rising house prices. Therefore, the focus
switches to income multiples. 
Income Multiples
The 1980s saw a progressive increase in average
income multiples for both first-time buyers and former
owner-occupiers. Across all buyers, the average
income multiple rose from 1.6 in 1980 to 2.1 in 1989,
as can be seen in Chart 2. Throughout much of the
1990s the average income multiple was fairly steady.
There has, however, been some upward creep in the
average income multiple for all types of buyers since
1997, but most noticeably for former owner-occupiers. 
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Most of the statistical data used in this article is
drawn from the Survey of Mortgage Lenders, and
its predecessor the 5% Sample Survey of Building
Society Mortgages. This permits a comparison of
lending criteria over a period of more than 30
years. However, there are some limitations in the
data sets, as follows:
The surveys only collect purchase price
information, not valuations. Strictly speaking,
therefore, the information reported as LTV is the
ratio of loan size to purchase price – the main
effect is to exaggerate reported LTV levels,
especially for first time buyers purchasing under
Right to Buy where substantial discounts to
market values were available.
With respect to income multiples, the surveys do
not distinguish how many incomes support the
loan application. To the extent that two-income
households have become much more prevalent, a
stable income multiple figure over time based on
these surveys would imply some relaxation of
lending criteria, other things being equal.
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CHART 2: AVERAGE INCOME MULTIPLES, 1969-2000
Source: CML/DETR Survey of Mortgage Lenders
While the average (mean) income multiple offers
some indication of the degree to which household
resources are being stretched, a fuller picture is found
by studying the proportion of income multiples
within pre-defined bands. Each band represents a
degree of income stretch, varying from low to very
high. This is what lies behind the next few charts. 
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CHART 3: INCOME MULTIPLE BANDS, FIRST-TIME BUYERS,
1985-2000, % OF TOTAL
Source: CML/DETR Survey of Mortgage Lenders
Chart 3 focuses on the proportion of observations in
six defined income multiple bands for first-time
buyers. It shows that the proportion of first-time
purchasers borrowing an income multiple of 3 or
more rose progressively between 1986 and 1990.
Significantly, the proportion of borrowers in each of
the top two income multiple bands rose from around
1⁄2% to 4%. Bringing the story forward to the present,
one of the most noticeable aspects of the income
multiple distribution is the tiny proportion of
borrowing to first-time buyers with income multiples
of 4 or more and, hence, in our most stretched
category. There has been no discernible increase in
lending within this highest income multiple category.
However, there has been some upward drift in the
proportion of borrowers with income multiples of
between 31⁄2 and 4. This proportion peaked at 5% of
the total in early 2000 since when the trend appears
to have levelled out. 
an income multiple of three or more is thought to fit
this description then lending criteria might be thought
to have been relaxed even though there had been no
increase in the proportion of high income multiples.
12 HOUSING FINANCE NO 50 MAY 2001
0
20
40
60
80
100
0-2.49 2.5-2.99 3-3.49 3.5-3.99 4 or more
CHART 4: INCOME MULTIPLE BANDS, MOVERS, 1985-2000
% OF TOTAL
Source: CML/DETR Survey of Mortgage Lenders
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Chart 4 repeats the exercise for those moving house
and broadly similar observations to those made for
first-time buyers apply. There has been very little
movement of late in the proportions borrowing 4 or
more times income, with the most recent figures
pointing to falls, while the rise in lending at between
31⁄2 and 4 times income has ceased.
Nationally, therefore, the available evidence does not
point to an increasing share of especially high income
multiple loans – those borrowing 4 or more times
income. This is most clearly demonstrated in Chart 5
which focuses on all house purchase loans. As can be
seen, across all buyers the proportion of loans with
income multiples above 3.5 has stopped rising. Chart
5 also illustrates nicely the importance of defining
what one means by high income multiple lending. If
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CHART 5: % IN INCOME MULTIPLE BAND, ALL BUYERS,
1985-2000
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Source: CML/DETR Survey of Mortgage Lenders
While Chart 5 shows that over 40% of loans are
currently based on income multiples of 3 or more,
this result is heavily influenced by the housing
market in the south of England. Chart 6 shows the
effect of excluding London. Outside of London only
20% of all house purchase loans have an income
multiple of either 3 or more and just 1% a multiple of
4 or more.
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CHART 6: % IN INCOME  MULTIPLE BAND, ALL BUYERS,
LONDON AND REST OF UK, 1985-2000
A full snapshot for the regions and countries of the
UK for 2000 is shown in Chart 7. 3.2% of loans for
house purchase in London have an income multiple
of 4 or more, with those for house purchase in East
Anglia closest at 2.6%. In contrast, the proportion is
below 1% for house purchase in Wales, Scotland and
Yorkshire and Humberside. The ordering is pretty
much in line with recent trends in house price growth
with the largest proportion of high income multiples
in southern regions of England. Outside London, the
South East and East Anglia, at least four out of five
house purchase loans are with income multiples of
less than 3. Therefore, while some stretching of
income multiples has occurred, its extent is limited
numerically and geographically.
the price of property relative to general inflation. The
second part is the change in the real property price
and if this is unaffected by general inflation then
house price changes will be lower under lower
inflation. Consequently, the value of collateral will
grow less slowly and “… the risk of insufficient
collateral coverage is greater the lower the rate of
inflation”. (FSA, 2001).
However, it is worth remembering that lenders do in
fact have two forms of security when lending. First
and foremost is a personal covenant with the
borrower, while the second is the value of the
collateral. The security represented by the personal
covenant depends on how debt servicing costs stretch
household budgets both now and in the future and the
certainty or otherwise of household income. The low
inflation delivered by the new macro-economic
framework not only lowers initial debt servicing costs
relative to income but is also likely to constrain the
level of future interest rates within a much narrower
band than previously, in turn reducing the likelihood
of future payment shocks. 
It is of course true that, under low inflation,
households’ mortgage payments as a share of income
will persist for longer periods and may after many
years come to account for a larger share of income
than would have been the case with higher inflation,
higher interest rates and higher earnings growth. But
it difficult to apportion much weight to this very
long-term effect, especially when the average length
of a mortgage is probably no more than about six
years.
Overall, the bottom line would appear to be that a
loan with a particular income multiple may actually
be less rather than more risky under low inflation.
Indeed, this may be an important reason, alongside
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CHART 7: INCOME MULTIPLE BANDS BY REGION OF
HOUSE PURCHASE, ALL BUYERS, 2000
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Source: CML/DETR Survey of Mortgage Lenders
The analysis to this point has focused on lenders’
lending criteria with respect to house purchase.
However, remortgaging activity is another potential
route through which lenders could loosen their
criteria in order to increase the size of their book,
especially given the sizeable increase in remortgaging
activity that has taken place in the past few years.
Chart 8 shows that the proportion of remortgaging
involving income multiples of 3 or more, and
particularly very high income multiples, has changed
very little since 1992. Again lenders do not appear to
have succumbed to pressures to undertake imprudent
lending.
Low inflation
Although the trends in income multiples and LTVs do
not suggest a systematic easing of lending criteria,
fundamental to the FSA’s recent concerns is the
potential impact of low inflation. Lenders need to be
aware of the likely effect of low inflation on the value
of their collateral – the property – over time. The
change in the price of the property can be thought of
as depending on general inflation and the change in
0
3
6
9
12
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
%
3-3.49
3.5-3.99
4 or more
CHART 8: INCOME MULTIPLE BANDS, REMORTGAGING,
% OF TOTAL
Source: CML/DETR Survey of Mortgage Lenders
currently buoyant labour market conditions, why
households’ confidence in their financial situation has
been so strong. 
Non-Mortgage Debt
Another concern highlighted by the FSA is the
growth in consumer credit or non-secured debt since
the housing market boom of the late 1980s. This
almost certainly does represent an increase risk for
lenders, although lack of good quality information
about how consumer credit is distributed across
households makes it difficult to gauge its precise
significance. 
As Chart 9 shows consumer credit in 2000 was worth
the equivalent to 13% of the UK’s GDP – double the
figure in the late 1980s. At the same time mortgage
debt has grown less markedly as a share of GDP, and
is currently equivalent to a 55% share of GDP.
regarded as a liquid asset. As the popularity of
flexible mortgages grows the ability to draw down
equity will become available to a much wider range
of borrowers. Even though the providers of flexible
mortgages have developed more sophisticated
systems to assess and monitor individual credit risk,
it seems inevitable that the prudential concerns of
supervisors with respect to flexible mortgages will
grow.
Risk assessment techniques
As part of a joint research project by the CML and
the Bank of England focusing on Mortgage Equity
Withdrawal a survey quizzed lenders on lending
criteria. One of its main findings is that lenders are
employing increasingly sophisticated risk assessment
techniques, aided in no small part by an increasing
role for technology. It is recognized by many lenders
that income alone is, at best, a crude measure of the
ability to repay. Affordability models are replacing
simple income multiple lending with, for instance,
consideration of the borrowers’ salary band, existing
credit commitments and payment history. To the
extent that lending criteria have changed with new
assessment techniques, lenders in the survey did not
feel they had become more lenient or that their credit
standards had fallen. One effect of the greater
sophistication applied is that the actual income
multiples observed will inevitably become more
differentiated.
Increasingly, lenders are also evaluating the overall
risk profile of their lending portfolios, assessing such
factors as the geographical breakdown of their
lending and the concentration of particular types of
products. Lenders may then choose to manage the
risk of their portfolio by imposing limits on high-risk
lending. 
Conclusions
Fears that lenders have systematically reduced credit
standards is, in the main, not borne out by the
available data. There is no evidence of increasing
proportions of very high LTV lending, which could in
the event of a downturn in the housing market leave
lenders exposed. There has been some evidence of an
upward increase in income multiples, concentrated
particularly in the southern part of the UK, reflecting
recent patterns in house price growth. However,
recent data suggests that the upward trend has abated.
To the extent that there has been higher income
multiple lending, in the context of competitive
conditions and affordability pressures this has been a
very measured response. Given the risk-reducing
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CHART 9: COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLD DEBT, % OF GDP
Flexible mortgages
The advent of flexible mortgages poses a series of
new questions in ensuring prudent lending practice.
In this edition of Housing Finance, Munro et al,
discuss the some features of flexible mortgages.
Evidence from their lenders’ survey, shows that the
greatest use of flexible mortgages has been
accelerated repayment. This characteristic is
effectively risk-reducing, but may simply reflect the
financial sophistication, initial income and age profile
of initial flexible mortgage-holders.
Munro et al indicate that one key feature of flexible
mortgages is the flexibility to withdraw funds.
Flexible mortgages inevitably blur the boundaries
between secured and non-secured debt. In some cases
a certain proportion of housing wealth can be
effects of low inflation on the share of household
budgets accounted for by mortgage payments, these
modest changes in lending criteria by no means
imply a deterioration in credit standards. 
Some developments will require continuing vigilance
by lenders to ensure that prudent lending is
maintained. Most notable are the sizeable level of
non-secured debt and the increasing popularity of
flexible mortgages.
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